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Abstract — Cloud-based services have become part of our day-to-day software solutions. The identity authentication process is 
considered to be the main gateway to these services. As such, these gates have become increasingly susceptible to aggressive 
attackers, who may use Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to close these gates permanently. There are a number of authentication 
protocols that are strong enough to verify identities and protect traditional networked applications. However, these authentication 
protocols may themselves introduce DoS risks when used in cloud-based applications. This risk introduction is due to the 
utilization of a heavy verification process that may consume the cloud’s resources and disable the application service. In this 
work, we propose a novel cloud-based authentication protocol suite that not only is aware of the internal DoS threats but is also 
capable of defending against external DoS attackers. The proposed solution uses a multilevel adaptive technique to dictate the 
efforts of the protocol participants. This technique is capable of identifying a legitimate user’s requests and placing them at the 
front of the authentication process queue. The authentication process was designed in such a way that the cloud-based servers 
become footprint-free and completely aware of the risks of any DoS attack. 
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1. Introduction and related works 
Cloud computing is the utilization of hardware and software to provide services to end users over a network, such as the Internet. 
Cloud computing includes a set of virtual machines that simulate physical computers and provide services, such as operating 
systems and applications. However, configuring the virtualization within a cloud computing environment is critical when 
deploying a cloud computing system. A cloud computing structure relies on three service layers: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), 
Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS) (Figure 1). IaaS provides users with access to physical resources, 
networks, bandwidth, and storage. PaaS builds on IaaS and provides end users access to the operating systems and platforms 
necessary to build and develop applications, such as databases. SaaS provides end users with access to software applications. 
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Figure 1. Cloud computing architecture 
 
DoS attacks represent major security risks in a cloud computing environment, where the resources are shared by many users. A 
DoS attack targets the resources or services in an attempt to render them unavailable by flooding the system resources with heavy 
amounts of artificial traffic. Dealing with DoS attacks at all layers of cloud systems is a major challenge due to the difficulty of 
distinguishing the attackers’ requests from legitimate user requests, particularly when the data are transferred between the layers 
of the cloud computing systems. Therefore, detecting a DoS attack in its early stage, in the upper layer (SaaS), is a significant 
approach to avoid the destruction caused by DoS attacks on the other layers. However, all service requests for SaaS must be 
authenticated to be approved. 
Many authentication protocols can be used in the SaaS layer. The OAuth protocol [1] is currently a widely used authentication 
protocol that controls the access of third-party applications to a HTTP service. In OAuth, the resource owner can allow a third-
party client to access the resources through the owner. For example, a user as a photo owner (resource owner) can grant 
permission to a printing service (client) to access the user’s photos. The photos are stored on photo exchange server as a (resource 
server). Rather than sharing the user’s credential with the printing service, the user is authenticated to a server that is trusted by 
the photo exchange server (authorization server), which then issues a credential (such as an access token) to access the resources. 
There are limitations when the owner shares credentials, such as a username, and password with the third-party client to access 
restricted resources. The first limitation is that the access information includes the password, which is most likely stored by a 
third-party client as clear-text for future access. The second limitation is that the server should only use a password as an 
authentication method. The third limitation is that the resource’s owner cannot limit the access of a third-party client and also 
cannot control the duration of the access. Finally, if the password is accessible in a third-party client, all the resources will be 
accessible, as well. Therefore, OAuth allows a third-party client to access the resources of the server with privileges and rules 
without using the resource owners’ access information. The process of the protocol, as shown in Figure 2, operates in the 
following manner: 
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Figure 2.  The process of the OAuth protocol. 
 
(1) The protocol process starts when the resource owner receives an authorization request from the client. 
(2) The resource owner sends back the authorization grant to the client. The clients’ authorization request determines the type of 
grant. Examples of the different types of grant are as follows:  
• Authorization code grants that are given to the client by the resource owner after the resource owner has been 
authorized by the authorization server. With such a code, the client does not require the resource owner credentials, and it 
is a secure grant type. 
• Implicit grants that depend on browser implementation using a scripting language, such that the access token is issued 
directly to the client. The implicit grant minimizes the flow process of the protocol but also leads to security issues.  
• Resource owner password credentials grant that uses the resource owner’s credentials (username and password) to 
issue an access token to the client. This type of grant can be used when the client is highly trusted by the resource owner.  
• Client credentials grant that can be used for a limited scope of access to protected resources on the server. This type 
of grant is used when the client is a resource owner or when the client previously had privileges to access the protected 
resource.  
(3) The client sends an authorization grant and the authentication to an authorization server to obtain the access token.  
(4) The access token will be provided to the client once the client is authenticated and the authorization grant is validated by the 
authorization server. In this case, the access token replaces the typical authentication, such as username and password, and is also 
recognized by the resource server. The access token can be used in different methods based on the security requirements of the 
server, such as with different types of cryptography. When the token is expired or became invalid, the token can be refreshed as 
an optional process by sending the authorization grant to an authorization server, whereupon the client receives a request with the 
access token and refresh token. 
(5) The client sends the access token to request restricted resources from the resource server.  
(6) The server will respond to the request when validating the access token.  
However, any insecure implementation of OAuth protocol can lead to the possibility of a DoS attack.  
Many authentication protocols have been proposed for the SaaS layer, but they are unaware of a DoS attack. Yassin et al. [2] 
proposed an authentication process based on a one-time password (OTP) with mutual authentication of the user and the cloud 
server. Yassin’s authentication schemas defended against the possibility of a replay attack, but not against a DoS attack. Some 
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cloud-based authentication protocols for DoS prevention have been proposed, such as those by Choudhury et al. [3], Hwang et al. 
[4], Jaidhar [5], and  Tsaur et al. [6], but they use a smart card reader for the authentication process. Furthermore, the Yassin et al. 
[7] schema also recommend the use of an extra physical device, such as a fingerprint scanner.  
On their own, the authentication protocols can lead to vulnerability to a DoS attack. Therefore, it is necessary and significant to 
verify the DoS-resistance in every process of the authentication protocol. For example, on the one hand, verifying a large number 
of signed messages via the server consumes the resources of the server to a significant degree, particularly when the attacker 
sends a massive number of forged signed messages. On the other hand, sending a typical client credential with each request in the 
authentication protocol will force the server to verify these requests based on the stored information at the server. As a 
consequence, the server resources will be exhausted when dealing with a large number of requests.  
An example of authentication protocols that can introduce internal DoS risks on their own is shown in Figure 3. The goal of this 
protocol is to authenticate both the client and the server to each other. This protocol uses the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key-
exchange [8], where a, b, p, and g are the values of Diffie-Hellman. In this protocol, once the server receives a request from a 
client, the server will begin generating the secret value b. Subsequently, the server will compute the exponential value, gb mod p. 
Moreover, the server will encrypt the nonce of the client and the exponential value via the client public key. Finally, the server 
will digitally sign the encrypted message. All of these processes will be executed by the server, which consumes a great deal of 
resources without determining whether the request is legitimate. This mutual authentication, which is vulnerable to DoS attack, is 
similar to the two-way authentication version of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [9]. As another example of a 
protocol that introduces DoS risk on its own is Kim et al.’s protocol [10], which aims to securely authenticate the key exchange 
between participants. In this protocol, once the server receives the first message, the server will begin computing an exponential 
value and generate the key, and as such, the server resources can become exhausted by the initial requests. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Mutual authentication protocol 
 
An example of an authentication protocol that is aware of a DoS attack in the traditional network is a Host Identity Protocol (HIP) 
[11]. However, this protocol cannot be implemented in the application layer because it is based on the host identity on the network 
layers in the OSI reference model, and it is configured and controlled at an operating system level. Moreover, any authentication 
protocol that is based on IP address verification, such as the IPSec protocol, makes it difficult to hide the identity of the 
participants. 
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In this work, we present a novel cloud-based authentication protocol suite that can defend against external DoS attacks and also 
conveys an awareness of internal DoS attacks. The proposed protocol suite uses an adjustable technique to direct the efforts of the 
protocol participants. This technique can recognize a legitimate user’s requests and passes such requests to the authentication 
process. The authentication process was developed to become fully aware of any possibility of DoS attacks while avoiding the use 
of any extra physical devices. Section 2 describes the CSA protocol against DoS attacks in the SaaS layer. Section 3 demonstrates 
the security of the CSA protocol against DoS attacks. Finally, section 4 briefly summarizes the work. 
 
2. Cloud-based secure authentication (CSA) protocol suite 
The authentication protocol must be investigated in terms of its vulnerability to DoS attack by using a cost-based model approach 
[12]. The cost-based model approach proposed by Meadows aims to prevent DoS attacks during the authentication process. This 
model depends on the exhausted resource costs of the participants. The cost-based model approach logically demonstrates the 
effectiveness of the protocols in preventing DoS attacks. In this approach, the computation cost is defined as the total resource 
usage cost of the requester (client) and responder (server) when both participate in the authentication protocol. The cost is 
computed during the process until the DoS attacker is detected and is prevented from participating. The total cost of the requester 
is the total estimated cost of each operation involved in the authentication process on requester’s side until the authentication 
process ends. However, the total cost of the responder is the total estimated cost of each operation during the authentication 
process until the requester is determined to be either a legitimate requester or attacker. 
Meadows proposed the following categories for an operation’s cost: inexpensive, medium, and expensive. This approach assumed 
that the exponential, check signature and signature operations performed during the authentication process are expensive. The pre-
calculated exponential value, encryption, and decryption operations are of medium cost. Any other operation is inexpensive. 
Therefore, the CSA protocol was developed so that the total resource cost of the client’s side will be greater than the resource 
operations cost of the cloud-based server when they participate in the authentication process together. Table (1) shows the 
notations that are used in the CSA protocol suite. 
 
Table 1 - Notations of the CSA protocol 
Notation Description 
client The cloud user 
cloudserv The cloud server/service provider 
CID Client ID 
UET Unique encrypted text; the key of the UET is known only by cloudserv 
SK Session key 
A  A set of random integers of the server challenge function 
S A subset sum of the server challenge function 
B A binary vector representing the challenge function solution  
Rcloudserv The nonce that is generated by cloudserv 
T Timestamp  
MK Master secret key of cloudserv  
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CSA consists of sets of protocols. The first protocol is used for the registration process, which is an agreement process between 
the participants (client and cloudserv) about certain shared information. Thus, the participants can use that information during the 
operation of other CSA protocols. The second protocol is an adaptive protocol that works against DoS attacks. This protocol was 
developed based on the cost-based model approach. The third protocol is used for the authentication process, which includes all 
operations that occur based on the initially agreed-upon information of the previous protocols. As a result, cloudserv can confirm 
the identity of the client and then complete the authentication process, or it can detect and then prevent an intruder in the case of a 
DoS attack. 
 
2.1 Registration protocol 
In the CSA registration protocol, the client and cloudserv will share the required identity data to register the client into the 
cloudserv database. As shown in Figure 4, the registration process begins when the client submits all the required information to 
cloudserv. This information involves the first name, last name, organization name, email address, or any other information that is 
required by the cloud service provider. Cloudserv will then verify the received information, store it in a database, and then it will 
send a validation email message to the client to confirm the client’s information. After validation, cloudserv will activate the 
client’s account. At the same time, cloudserv will generate a Unique Encrypted Text (UET) that is encrypted by the cloudserv’s 
master key (MK), which is known only by the cloudserv. The UET contains client information, such as the Client ID (CID), as 
well as any other information that will be created by cloudserv during the processes of the CSA protocols. The UET is a piece of 
information that will not be stored on cloudserv; rather, it will be sent to the requesting client. Once the client receives the 
required data from cloudserv, both client and cloudserv will agree regarding the pre-shared key. The pre-shard key will be created 
using a key derivation function and a shared secret. The client and cloudserv will agree upon the key derivation function and a 
shared secret at the end of the registration protocol, which will be exchanged via a secure channel in a very restricted 
environment. This approach is very much similar to the pre-shard key agreement (PSK) used in the UMTS and WPA2 protocols 
[13]. Consequently, the client will store the UET and a pre-shared key for a future authentication process.  
  
 
Figure 4.  Registration protocol 
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 Even if a client is registered to the cloudserv, the client cannot access the services available through the cloudserv unless 
cloudserv authenticates the client. To perform the authentication protocol that is ready to defend any internal or external DoS 
attacks, CSA provides an outer shield to the authentication protocol to help identify the legitimate clients from the DoS attackers.  
The CSA-adaptive DoS defender protocol is designed to provide this outer shield in a manner described in the following sub-
section.  
 
2.2 CSA-adaptive DoS defender protocol  
The CSA-Adaptive DoS Defender Protocol utilizes the cost-based model approach that can be briefly re-stated as follows. Before 
applying the computational power of the authentication protocols in the server side, the clients are asked to prove their sincere 
commitment for receiving the cloudserv services. This validation of commitment can be achieved by any technique that can force 
the clients to utilize a significant amount of computational power, before the servers utilize them, to confirm their genuine 
requests. Currently, “Client puzzles” is a common technique that realizes the cost-based model approach [14]. 
In this work, a one-way function based technique is proposed to realize the cost-based model approach. A cryptographic knapsack 
problem was chosen, not only because it is a strong one-way function but also for its flexibility to be adaptive [15]. The strength 
of the knapsack problem comes from being one of those problems known to be a NP-complete problem [16]. In addition, the main 
characteristic of the selected one-way function in this protocol is an adjustable difficulty level for solving the puzzle based on the 
demanded efforts on the client’s side. 
In cryptography, a knapsack problem is described as follows: given a set of positive integers (i.e., items) A= a1 … an and a 
positive integer value S, is there a non-empty subset of a1 … an whose values sum to S? For example, let the set of items in a 
knapsack A be (13, 54, 28, 73, 3, 36) and the summation S be 89. Therefore, finding the elements 13, 73, and 3 solves the problem 
because their summation is equal to 89.  In other words, finding a binary vector B such that A × B = S solves the problem. In this 
example B is the vector (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0), and hence A×B = 13 + 73 + 3 which is 89.  
Typically, the complexity of the knapsack problem depends on the size of the knapsack A (the number of its items, say n) and on 
the number of 1s (say m) in the binary vector B. Note that if the number of items in A, i.e., n, is small, then an exhaustive search 
for the solution is practical. Note also that, if the number of 1s in B, i.e., m is small comparing to (n), then a solution can be found 
in a reasonable time via dynamic programming algorithms. 
Consequently, by adjusting the values of n and m, determining the difficultly level of the knapsack problem and hence the cost-
based approach can be adaptively realized. The CSA protocol considers n = 512 items. These items are fixed integer values that 
both parties should agree upon during the registration protocol. Based on the experimental result (see section III-B), obtaining 
vector B will force the client to become involved in finding the solution to 2512 subsets, which is a highly time and resource 
consuming process. The number of subsets of items is adjustable based on the required efforts of the participants. Moreover, the 
chosen items that are used during the summation process are determined by hashing the values of CID, MK, and Rcloudserv using 
SHA2-512, where MK is the master secret key of the cloudserv. Note that the result of the hash function is a 512-bit stream. 
Moreover, the subset of the 512-bit stream that includes a specific number of ones (m) represents the required vector, B, of the 
knapsack problem. For example, if the protocol developed to let m = 55, the cloudserv will take the subset of the 512-bit stream 
that includes the first 55 ones; increasing the m value will make the process of solving the puzzle harder while also increasing the 
time-consuming nature of the puzzle-solving process. The hashing process is mandatory to verify the subset summation value (S) 
of the client after the calculation process. 
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The adaptive DoS defender protocol process shown in Figure 5 functions as follows: 
1) Client sends a request for a service with CID to cloudserv.  
At this point, cloudserv will block any CID that has performed three consecutive requests within a low time threshold to 
prevent DoS attacks. The attacker may attempts to launch a DoS attack by sending requests with randomly generated 
CID values. In this case, the cloudserv resources will be less affected than when checking each request for information 
from a database system because cloudserv will simply reply to each request with an S value.  
 
2) Cloudserv will reply directly to the client by sending the puzzle element as a challenge, which is the subset summation 
value (S) along with a cloudserv nonce, Rcloudserv, to the client.  
Cloudserv will ask the client to prove its sincere commitment for receiving the cloudserv services by asking for the UET 
as well as the puzzle solution to the (S) value. The expected solution for this challenge is the vector B.  
3) Once the client performs a calculation and obtains vector B, the client will send the UET, vector B, the value of S, the 
received Rcloudserv, CID and the encrypted timestamp T to cloudserv for validation. Note that the notation E(T, Kpre-shared) 
means that the timestamp T is encrypted by the pre-shared key K. 
At this point, cloudserv has all the information required to validate the authentication requests, so cloudserv can apply 
the validation process to only a few operations, such as the following: 
 Cloudserv will check the subset of item ai by securely hashing (CID, MK, Rcloudserv) and comparing the result vector 
with the received vector B to determine whether they are similar. 
 Cloudserv will check the time difference between the received encrypted timestamp T and the current time stamp to 
determine whether it is a reasonable time difference in which to find the solution.  
If any of the two previous conditions do not apply, cloudserv will drop the request and consider it to be an attacker’s request. 
However, once the client request passes the two conditions, cloudserv will decrypt the UET and validate the decrypted 
information that contains the CID. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Adaptive DoS defender protocol 
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To complete the authentication process after the adaptive protocol determined the client as being legitimate, the CSA protocol 
develops an authentication protocol. The participants in the authentication protocol will agree on the session key for future 
interactions. In addition, they can agree on the sub-session key if they require a refreshment process later.  
2.3 Authentication protocol 
After the validation process in the previous protocol, cloudserv will generate the Session Key (SK), which is encrypted via a pre-
shared key. Moreover, cloudserv will add both the SK and T information to the UET. Consequently, cloudserv is protected against 
DoS attacks to the storage space because UET will never be saved in the cloudserv. Furthermore, cloudserv can apply the 
refreshment property of the session key for future communication by adding the SK to the UET.   
Therefore, the authentication protocol, as shown in Figure 6, performs as follows: 
1) Cloudserv will send to the client the generated SK that is encrypted by the pre-shared key, along with the modified UET.  
2) Client will confirm the received encrypted SK by sending back the modified UET and the encrypted timestamp T to the 
cloudserv. Therefore, cloudserv will decrypt the UET, validate the CID and obtain the SK, then confirm it by decrypting 
the received timestamp T using the SK.  
Later, the two parties can agree regarding the sub-session keys by re-applying the processes of the authentication protocol so 
that the cloudserv can generate a sub-session key and add it to the UET without storing it in the cloud system. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Authentication protocol 
 
3. Analysis of the CSA protocol suite 
Assessment of the CSA protocol entails evaluation of the protocol’s efficiency against DoS attacks by applying a cost-based 
model approach. In addition, the evaluation process measures the requester’s time spent when the client participates in the puzzle-
solving process during the authentication process. 
 
3.1 Validation of the CSA protocol suite via a cost-based model approach 
As shown in Table II, based on the cost-based model approach, the operation cost of the client for the CSA protocol is categorized 
as expensive, particularly when the client solves the puzzle. The other operations of the client are listed within the medium or 
inexpensive categories. However, the maximum operation costs of cloudserv, including the pre-calculation and decryption 
operations, are within the medium category. As a result, the CSA protocol suite is an effective protocol against DoS attacks, in 
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which the consumption cost for the requester is higher than the consumption cost for the cloud service provider during the 
authentication process. 
 
 
Table 2 - Validation of the CSA protocol suite via a cost-based model approach 
Client Cloudserv 
Operation Cost Category Operation Cost Category 
Send the initial request. Inexpensive 
Reply directly to the request via secure 
hashing of the received values to obtain the 
puzzle element and ask the client for the UET. 
Inexpensive-
Medium 
Solve the puzzle until the result is 
obtained. Then, send the result and the 
UET to cloudserv. 
Expensive Verify the received elements. Medium 
Decrypt the session key (this operation 
occurs after the prevention of possible 
DoS requests). 
Medium 
Decrypt the UET. Generate and encrypt the 
session key (this operation occurs after the 
prevention of possible DoS requests). 
Medium 
 
3.2 Analysis of the response time for the puzzle-solving process 
During the registration protocol, both parties acknowledge the fixed number of items n that can be used in the puzzle-solving 
process. Consequently, it is important to identify the number of combination items that leads to an acceptable response-time on 
the requester’s side during this process. An experiment that uses various numbers of combination items is performed to estimate 
the average response-time in seconds for each combination. In our experiment, we used a dynamic programming algorithm to 
solve a subset sum puzzle problem of n =100 items. The experiment was performed using a i7-4770 CPU at 3.4GHz with 32 GB 
RAM. Our experiment indicates that applying dynamic programming to n = 100 items with m = 80 combination items can solve 
the subset sum problem in approximately 8 seconds, which is still a small amount of time to be consuming the requester’s 
resources. Tritilanunt et al. [17] implemented the L3 algorithm developed by Lenstra et. al. [18] to solve the subset sum problem. 
They limited their experiment to n = 100 items due to the memory-exhausted limitation. Moreover, their experiment indicated that 
the L3 algorithm can solve the subset sum problem of n = 100 items with m = 80 combination items in 2.7 k seconds. While our 
experiment with the same number of items n and the same combinations of items m indicates that the subset sum problem can be 
solved in approximately 8 seconds. Therefore, depending on the L3 algorithm to develop an authentication protocol with a subset 
sum problem of n = 100 items makes the protocol itself vulnerable to a DoS attack. As a result, we applied dynamic programing 
to a subset sum problem of n = 512 items. We experimentally found that m between 50 to 60 combination items causes 
approximately 20 seconds of delay on the client’s side, as shown in Figure 7. Based on a study performed by Nielsen [19], 20 
seconds is a reasonable response time that is affected by the process of solving the subset sum puzzle problem, such that the 
legitimate user’s resources turn out to be busier for a period of time with each initial request. At the same time, this resource-
exhausting process will influence an attacker who launches a DoS attack with a massive number of requests from his device. If the 
attacker uses many devices to launch DoS attacks, the cloud system will not be exhausted because the attack will be detected at 
the early stage of the authentication process. 
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   Figure 7.  The response time of the requester (in seconds) with various number of combination items 
 
4. Conclusions 
The use of software systems in a cloud-computing environment is increasingly common. Verifying users via an authentication 
protocol is considered to be an initial stage to access these systems. Consequently, the authentication protocol is a main target of 
attackers implementing a DoS attack that decreases the availability of cloud services. Using existing strong authentication 
protocols of traditional network systems in cloud-based applications may lead to DoS attack vulnerability because the initiation of 
a massive amount of authentication processes could exhaust the cloud’s resources and render the cloud-based application 
unreachable. In this study, the proposed CSA protocol suite aimed to prevent internal and external risks to DoS attacks. The CSA 
protocol uses an adaptive challenge technique based on the required efforts of the participants. Using this technique allows the 
system to identify legitimate requests and pass them to the cloud applications. This CSA protocol suite does not require any 
external physical device for the authentication process. The effectiveness of the CSA protocol was analyzed in this work using a 
cost-based model approach, and the ability of the protocol to fortify against a DoS attack was demonstrated. 
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